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11. Introduction
The determinants of the cross-section of announcement returns in public-to-public acquisitions are the
subject of an ongoing debate in corporate finance. A particular point of contention is the fact that these
announcement returns are, on average, significantly negative (e.g. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002;
Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008; Harford, Jenter, and Li, 2011; and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008).
Motivated by a neo-agency theory of takeovers, we construct a simple variable called target
acquisitiveness and find that it is strongly related to acquirer announcement returns. Announcement
returns average -0.51% for non-acquisitive targets, -1.67% when the target has made one acquisition
over the past three years and drop regularly and markedly to -6.22% when the target has made five or
more acquisitions over the past three years (Figure 1).1 Six out of the ten worst announcement returns
during our sample period involve an acquisitive target, while none of the best ten returns involve an
acquisitive target.2
Most importantly, our regression results indicate that target acquisitiveness is one of the most
significant explanatory variables in determining announcement returns. In particular, recognizing size is
an important determinant of announcement returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004), we show
that target acquisitiveness is related to announcement returns after controlling for acquirer size and
relative size. In addition, we use a large set of control variables proposed in the literature, 3 which
include year-industry fixed effects. In each specification, irrespective of the control variables, target
acquisitiveness is significantly negatively related to acquirer’s announcement returns. Moreover, we
find that target acquisitiveness is strongly negatively related to the probability of deal completion.
1 To illustrate, a typical deal, shown in Figure 2, is Firstar Corporation announcing its bid to acquire Mercantile
Bancorporation on April 30, 1999 for $10 billion, Mercantile Bancorporation had completed twelve acquisitions over the
previous three years. The stock price of Firstar Corporation dropped by 4.75% on that day, while the market rose by 0.23%.
2 This result is not tabulated. Acquisitiveness is defined as the number of acquisitions the firm made during the preceding
three years. A target is said to be “acquisitive” if it has made one or more acquisitions during the preceding three years.
3 Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table A.1.
2We argue that the ‘eat or be eaten’ theory of Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009), which we label
more generally as a neo-agency view of takeovers is consistent with our results. This theory may be
seen as a combination of the neoclassical view (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) and the agency view
(e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990). In a nutshell, the idea is that following a technological shock,
some firms start making value-enhancing acquisitions. As a result, these acquisitive firms become
larger and could then acquire more firms. A manager concerned with the prospect of becoming a
takeover target and the loss of private benefits of control this implies, would then acquire the acquisitive
company (i.e. eats in order not to be eaten). Such a ‘defensive’ acquisition should generate negative
announcement returns and the acquisitive target is expected to resist more acquisition attempts. This
view is, therefore, consistent with the set of findings mentioned above.
To further test this neo-agency view we carry out a series of empirical tests. We begin by
studying the size evolution of the target. We find that the average size growth rate of acquisitive targets
from one deal to the next is 27%, the average time period between two consecutive deals is six months
and an acquisitive target size is 0.6 times that of its acquirer on average. If we extrapolate these figures,
then it would have taken a mere twelve months or so for the acquisitive target to be larger than its
acquirer. Next, we study whether a company is more under threat to be acquired when there are more
companies that are slightly larger. The idea is that the acquisitive target might soon become ‘slightly
larger’, but the question becomes: is this the type of firms that constitute a threat?
We find that as the fraction of ‘slightly larger firms’ increases, the probability of being acquired
increases. For example, if the fraction of firms that are less than 1.25 times the size of the focal firm
goes from 2.6% (the mean) to just 3%, then the probability of being acquired increases by 5%. In fact,
we find that the fraction of (publicly-traded) firms that are slightly larger is the main driver of the
likelihood of being acquired for any firm in any year. We believe this result is novel and interesting per
se. Furthermore, we find that firms that made previous acquisitions are more likely to do new
3acquisitions. If the firm has not made any acquisition over the preceding three years, then the
probability of making a new acquisition over the following year is 19%. This probability increases to a
whopping 68% when the firm has made 5 or more acquisitions over the preceding three years. Thus,
firms that made previous acquisitions are more likely to make new acquisitions. Finally, we find that
acquirers who fail to acquire an acquisitive firm are more likely to be acquired in the future, while it is
not the case for those failing to acquire a non-acquisitive firm. Hence, acquiring an acquisitive firm
seems effective at reducing the chances of being acquired.
Taken together, this set of novel empirical results is consistent with the notion that acquisitive
targets were a likely threat to their acquirers and thus supports the neo-agency view. In addition, we
derive and test hypotheses that are specific to the Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009) model. Consistent
with this theory we first find that target acquisitiveness is related to announcement returns only when
private benefits of control are large as measured by either a corporate governance index or by the equity
ownership of the management. Second, target acquisitiveness is significantly related to announcement
returns only in industries where firms are of similar size. The effect is not significant in industries
dominated by a few large firms. Third, target acquisitiveness is significantly related to announcement
returns in deals where the target and the acquirer are from the same industry. The relationship is also
significant if the two firms are not from the same industry but the acquisitive target had made cross
industry deals before. The relationship is not significant, however, if it is a cross-industry deal and the
target never made a cross industry deal before. Fourth, the effect is significant only when the target is
large relative to the acquirer.
Our paper complements the wide literature on the drivers of acquirer’s announcement returns
(e.g., Harford, 1999; Officer, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Faccio,
McConnell, and Stolin, 2006; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006; Bouwman, Fuller, and
Nain, 2009; Cai, Song, and Walkling, 2011; and Cai and Sevilir, 2012). We show that a simple variable,
4the number of target’s past acquisitions, is related to the acquirer’s announcement returns. Our paper
also complements the literature on the determinants of acquisition success (e.g., Comment and Schwert,
1995; Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003; Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011; and Golubov, Petmezas,
Travlos, 2012). We show that the number of target’s past acquisitions is one of the main explanatory
variables for the likelihood of deal completion. Further, we complement the literature studying serial
acquirers (e.g., Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Billett and Qian, 2008; and Aktas, de Bodt, and
Roll, 2011). We note that targets can be serial acquirers too, and this attribute appears to be driving the
low acquirer announcement returns. Interestingly, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that the likelihood of
a serial acquirer being targeted is related to the announcement returns on its past deals. In contrast with
our study, they do not analyze the relation between target acquisitiveness and either acquirer
announcement returns or acquisition success.4
Note that our paper focuses on acquirer stock price reactions and has nothing to say about the
magnitude of synergy gains in M&A transactions (e.g., Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah, 2005;
Barraclough, Robinson, Smith, and Whaley, 2013). The fact that there are defensive acquisitions does
not mean that synergy gains are small overall. This important question is thus outside the scope of this
paper. Note also that we do not claim to identify the reason why acquisitions of acquisitive firms are
special, but we believe that we have narrowed down the set of potential explanations and as such
provide a potential direction for future research.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and provides
descriptive statistics. Section 3 shows the main empirical results. Section 4 is dedicated to the neo-
agency view and empirical tests. Section 5 discusses and tests some alternative explanations. In Section
6 we submit our main finding to a set of robustness tests, and Section 7 offers a brief conclusion.
4 Another related study is that of Offenberg, Straska, and Waller (2014) who examine the gains from takeovers of companies
that previously engaged in a value-reducing acquisition program. Their central finding is that the takeover premium is higher
when the value loss from the targets’ prior acquisitions is larger.
52. Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section first describes sample and variables construction. It also provides an initial look at the
relationship between the number of target’s past acquisitions and acquirer announcement returns, and
shows descriptive statistics on the differences between the characteristics of the deals where the target
has made prior acquisitions and those where it has not.
2.1 The sample
The sample of acquisitions comes from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and
Acquisitions Database (as of December 2010).5 As in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), we
construct our sample by employing the following eight filters. We include acquisitions in which (1) the
acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of the target, and the acquiring firm controls less than 50% of
the shares of the target firm before the announcement; (2) the transaction is completed; (3) the deal
value is greater than $1 million; (4) the number of days between the announcement and completion
dates is between zero and one thousand; (5) the target is a public or a private firm or a non-public
subsidiary of a public or private firm; (6) both the acquirer and the target are based in the US; (7) the
acquirer is a public firm listed on both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and
Compustat during the event window; (8) the deal value relative to the market value of the acquirer is no
less than 1%. In addition, (9) we exclude acquisitions made before 1985 (as in Cai, Song, and Walking,
2011) in order to leave enough time to measure accurately the number of past acquisitions of the
targets.6
Table 1 shows statistics for different samples. The first sample is labeled “Full sample of
acquisitions”. This is the sample obtained after applying filters (1) to (6). It contains 53,798
5 Our study focuses on U.S. domestic mergers and acquisitions only, for evidence of cross-board acquisitions see, for
example, Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012).
6 Note also that the limited coverage of SDC in early years would affect our measure of past acquisition activities.
6acquisitions. The sample obtained after applying all nine criteria is called “Full sample of acquisitions
matched to CRSP and Compustat” which includes 19,262 observations. Consistent with the sample
statistics in Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011), this sample is much smaller as it requires the
acquirer to be present in both CRSP and Compustat. Finally, we divide this sample into two sub-
samples based on whether the target is publicly listed or not, which gives us 14,976 non-public deals
and 4,286 public ones.
2.2. Main variables
2.2.1. Acquirer announcement returns
As in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), acquirer abnormal announcement return is the three-
day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) centered on the announcement date, using the CRSP
equal-weighted index return as the market return and with the market model parameters estimated over
the 200-day period from event day –205 to event day –6.7
The third column of Table 1 shows the average acquirer announcement returns for different
samples. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; and Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007) the average announcement return
for acquirers on the “Full sample matched to CRSP and Compustat” is positive at 1.41%, but it is
negative for the sub-sample of public targets (-0.98%).
< Table 1 >
2.2.2. Acquiring acquirers
In the last two columns of Table 1, we report the fraction of targets that made at least one acquisition
over the past three or five years. We find that the phenomenon of targeting acquirers is restricted to the
sample of publicly listed targets. We also observe little difference between the three-year and five-year
7 Results with other approaches used in the literature are shown in the robustness section.
7horizons. In the sub-sample of publicly listed targets, 27% of the targets have made at least one
acquisition over the previous three years.
In contrast, only 1% of non-public targets have made past acquisitions. This may be because
non-publicly traded companies are less prone to make acquisitions, or because the SDC has a lower
coverage for this type of company, or both. We thus focus on public targets in the main analysis but will
show results on the full sample in the robustness section. We choose the three-year window as default
since the same is used by Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) to classify serial acquirers.8
2.2.3. Number of past acquisitions and announcement returns
Table 2 presents some simple descriptive statistics relating announcement returns to the number of
target’s past acquisitions. 73% of the targets have not made any acquisitions over the preceding three
years and their acquirers have a relatively small negative average announcement return (-0.51%).
Restricting the sample to deals where the target has not made any prior acquisitions, therefore, (almost)
divides in half the overall average announcement returns (-0.98%). We also note that, as the number of
target’s past acquisitions increases, the average announcement returns decrease monotonically. When
the target has made five or more acquisitions, acquirer announcement returns reach -6.22%. This is,
however, a simple descriptive statistic and we investigate this phenomenon more thoroughly by means
of regression analysis in the next section.
< Table 2 >
8 In the robustness section we show results with a five-year event window, and when using instead of “Target pre3YR num
of deals”: i) the total dollar value of target’s past deals over the preceding three years, and ii) a dummy variable that is one if
the target has made acquisitions over the preceding three years and zero otherwise.
82.3. Descriptive statistics: Acquisitions over time and across industries
Appendix Table A.2 Panel A shows the annual distribution of our sample and the fraction of takeovers
of acquisitive firms. Consistent with Cai and Sevilir (2012), we see a peak in M&A activity in 1998 and
a trough in 2002, bouncing back in 2003 and decreasing slightly until 2007, before falling more sharply
throughout the 2008-2010 financial crisis.
The fraction of takeovers of acquisitive firms is stable at around 20% until 1994. It then
increases steadily to reach a peak of 38% in 1999, and remains relatively high throughout the following
years and peaks again in 2007, in the eve of the financial crisis. Table A.2 also shows the average
acquirer announcement returns. In all but 5 of the 26 years, the average announcement return is lower
for takeovers of acquisitive firms.
Panel B of Table A.2 shows the industry distribution of our sample based on the acquirer’s
industry as defined in Fama and French (1997). Industries which have fewer than 50 observations are
grouped in the “Rest of the industries” category.9 The top three industries ranked by the fraction of
acquisitive targets are communications (47%), healthcare (47%), and business services (38%). Four
industries (banking, pharmaceutical products, trading, and transportation) have the proportion of
acquisitive targets below 20%. In all but three industries, we see that the announcement returns for
acquisitive targets are lower than that for the full sample.
2.4. Descriptive statistics: Acquisitive firms versus non-acquisitive firms
We present descriptive statistics in Appendix Table A.3 for (1) the overall sample, (2) acquisitive-target
sample, and (3) non-acquisitive-target sample. The selected variables are the most standard ones used in
the literature, and are defined in Appendix Table A.1.10
9 Like Harford (2005) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), we use Fama-French 48-industry classification.
10 See Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) for a thorough discussion of these variables.
9Acquisitive firms are 2.5 times larger than non-acquisitive firms and their acquirers are twice as
large as the acquirers of non-acquisitive firms. The relative size of target to acquirer is 50% larger for
takeovers of acquisitive firms. These characteristics have been shown to be negatively related to
acquirer announcement returns (see Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Eckbo, Giammarino, and
Heinkel, 1990; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Bayazitova, Kahl, and Valkanov, 2012).
Acquisition of acquisitive firms is less (more) often paid in cash (stock).11 Travlos (1987) shows
that deals financed by stock earn lower announcement returns. Cai, Song, and Walkling (2011) show
that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. The anticipation-difference is,
however, small in our sample (10% of acquisitive-firm takeovers are made after a dormant period of
over one year as compared to 14% of non-acquisitive-firm takeovers). 12 Using the merger wave
classification of Harford (2005), we see that acquisitive firms are more likely to be taken over during
and post merger-waves.
Acquirers of acquisitive firms tend to be acquisitive themselves and have a higher Tobin’s q and
a lower leverage ratio. Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) report a positive relationship
between acquirer leverage and its announcement return. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) and Servaes
(1991) find a positive relation between acquirer Tobin’s q and the announcement return. Acquisitive
targets tend to be older, have lower cash holdings and a higher liquidity index (Schlingemann, Stulz,
and Walkling, 2002), and are more likely to include termination fee provisions (Bates and Lemmon,
2003; Officer, 2003) and incorporate in Delaware (Daines, 2001; Cai, Song, and Walkling, 2011).
11 Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) show that firm’s cash versus stock decision in acquisition financing is determined by
its target leverage. Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth (2011) show that lines of credit dominate cash in financing liquidity-
driven mergers.
12 If we restrict the sample to deals with acquisitive targets and acquirers in the same four-digit SIC code, we have 818
observations and only 2.4% of acquisitive firm acquisitions follow a dormant period. If we either reduce the acquisition
period to one year or increase the dormant period to three years, there are no acquisitive-firm acquisitions that follow a
dormant period.
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3. Main Empirical Results
This section establishes the main findings. The first sub-section discusses the drivers of acquirer
announcement returns and the second sub-section looks at the determinants of acquisition success.
3.1. Announcement returns and the number of target’s past acquisitions
As discussed above, takeovers of acquisitive firms differ from the average takeovers along many
dimensions that have been shown to be related to announcement returns in the literature. Thus, we
ought to run a multiple regression analysis that includes both our main variable and the control variables
used in the literature as covariates.13
Table 3 shows the results for three specifications. Acquirer announcement return is the
dependent variable in each specification. The first specification includes all the deal and acquirer
characteristics which are available for all of the observations as explanatory variables. Our main
variable (Target pre3YR num of deals) is highly significant and the signs of other control variables are
generally in line with those in the literature.14 The second specification adds acquirer characteristics that
require accounting data. Although we lose some observations, our main result is unchanged.
Since the fraction of acquisitive firms among the population of targets varies over time, we
ought to control for year fixed effects. It ensures that our results are not skewed by time specific events
such as the merger wave of the late 1990s, which was special in terms of both volume and
announcement returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008).
13 We implicitly assumed that the market reflects and incorporates information efficiently into stock prices. If the market
makes systematic mistakes in evaluating acquisition announcements and if this mistake is related to the number of target’s
past acquisitions, then our results may be spurious. To address this issue, we follow Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)
and calculate the three-year calendar-time monthly abnormal returns following the completion of acquisition transactions. In
non-tabulated results, we find that these long-term abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero for either the
sub-sample of acquisitive-firm acquisitions or for the sub-sample of non-acquisitive-firm acquisitions (nor for the full
sample), and there is no significant difference in abnormal returns between these two sub-samples.
14 Following Petersen (2009), we cluster standard errors by acquisition year. Results with other standard errors are shown in
the robustness section.
11
We observe that the fraction of acquisitive targets varies across industries, and it has been argued that
some industries systematically exhibit lower announcement returns. For instance, Masulis, Wang, and
Xie (2007) point out that product market competition in each industry matters for announcement
returns.15 More importantly, there may be time varying industry shocks that impact announcement
returns. Thus, in the third specification we control for year cross industry fixed effects and use it as the
default approach for all the regressions. 16 Our main variable (Target pre3YR num of deals) is
statistically significant at the 1% level test across all specifications.17 It is one of the most statistically
and economically significant variable across all three specifications.18
In non-tabulated results, we run similar regressions as in Table 3 but replacing the dependent
variables by either target announcement returns or combined announcement returns (i.e. the weighted
average of target and acquirer returns). We find that our variable (Target pre3YR num of deals) is
significantly and negatively related to both target and combined returns. This suggests that the
acquiring-acquirer deals are not a simple redistribution of surplus between the two merging parties.
< Table 3 >
3.2. Acquisition success and the number of target’s past acquisitions
We now investigate the determinants of acquisition success and test whether acquisitive targets resist
takeovers or welcome them. For our sample of 5,527 announced public acquisitions, we have a deal
completion rate of 78%. This is lower but close to the 83% success rate reported by Officer (2003) and
the 82% shown in Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011). The sub-sample for which the target is an acquisitive firm
15 See also Officer (2003) who shows that the banking industry has had particularly low announcement returns.
16 In the robustness tests (Table 12 Panel A), we show results with quarter cross industry fixed effects and month cross
industry fixed effects. Results are similar.
17 In order to control for trends in abnormal returns around the event, we follow Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) and
measure ‘stock price run-up’ over a 200-day window (-205, -6). In non-tabulated results, we also tried a “pre-event” window
of 50, 100, and 150 days, and a post-event window of 50, 100, 150, and 200 days. Our main results are unaffected by the
different measurement windows used.
18 Note that some deal and acquirer characteristics that are not statistically significant are not shown in the table; they are
labeled “Other deal characteristics” and “Other acquirer characteristics” and are listed in the table’s caption.
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has a completion rate of 73%, while it is 80% for the sub-sample of non-acquisitive targets. These
simple statistics suggest that target’s past acquisition history may influence acquirer’s probability of
success.
In Table 4, we estimate a Logit model for the probability of deal success (as in, e.g., Officer,
2003; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011; and Golubev, Petmezas, and
Travlos, 2012). The dependent variable is equal to one if the announced deal was successfully
completed and zero otherwise. The three specifications we run here mirror those of the previous table.
We show that the number of target’s past acquisitions has a significantly negative effect on acquisition
success. The marginal effects (not tabulated) also indicate that its economic magnitude is large. An
attempt to acquire a non-acquisitive target has a 20% probability of failing, while the probability rises to
35% if the target has made three prior acquisitions. We interpret this as evidence that acquisitive firms
are more reluctant to be acquired.19
< Table 4 >
3.3. Controlling for other target characteristics
In Tables 3 and 4, we control for various deal and acquirer characteristics and show that the number of
target’s past acquisitions is negatively related to announcement returns and acquisition success. We
have not, however, included other target characteristics mainly to preserve the number of observations
and rationing the number of explanatory variables in the main regression analysis. In Appendix Tables
A.4 and A.5, we add a large number of target characteristics onto the regressions. Our main results are,
however, not affected by adding these additional control variables.
19 The coefficients of the control variables are overall consistent with the literature (e.g., Officer, 2003; Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011; and Golubev, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2012). Larger acquirers,
tender offers and cash-financed deals are more likely to succeed. Deals that are hostile or competed are more likely to fail.
Higher acquirer past stock returns and a larger number of acquirer prior acquisitions are both associated to higher success
rates. Acquirer sigma is negatively associated to the likelihood of deal success. The acquirer is more likely to fail when
targeting older firms, firms with no target termination fees, with a higher Tobin’s q, and incorporated in Delaware.
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4. The Neo-agency View
In this section, we first argue that the recent ‘eat or be eaten’ theory of Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009),
which we label as the neo-agency view, is consistent with our results. We then derive additional
hypotheses from this theory and test them empirically.
4.1. The “eat or be eaten” theory
The two key assumptions of Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009) are that firms can only acquire companies
that are smaller than them, and that firm managers have ‘private benefits of control’. In a nutshell, the
idea is that following a technological shock, some firms start making value-enhancing acquisitions. As a
result, these acquisitive firms become larger and could then acquire more firms. A manager, concerned
with the prospect of becoming a takeover target and hence the potential loss of her private benefits of
control, would then acquire the acquisitive company (i.e. eats in order not to be eaten). Such a
‘defensive’ acquisition should generate negative announcement returns because it is motivated by the
preservation of private benefits of control rather than being motivated by synergy considerations. In
addition, an acquisitive target is more likely to resist takeover attempts for the same reason. This view is
consistent with the set of findings described above; but this view is also consistent with the body of
evidence supporting the neoclassical view of takeovers (e.g., on merger waves being initiated by
technological shocks; see Harford, 2005). In a sense, this is a neo-agency view of takeovers in that it
combines the neoclassical view (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) and the agency view (e.g., Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990).20
20 An article in The Economist titled “Battle of the internet giants: Survival of the biggest” (December 1, 2012) may illustrate
the neo-agency view: “Three trends alarm those who think the digital giants are becoming too powerful for consumers’ good
(...) The third concern is the internet behemoths’ habit of gobbling up promising firms before they become a threat. Amazon,
which raised $3 billion in a rare bond issue this week, has splashed out on firms such as Zappos, an online shoe retailer that
had ambitions to rival it. Facebook and Google have made big acquisitions too, such as Instagram and AdMob (…)”.
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4.2. Does the acquirer eat in order not to be eaten?
The average relative size between acquisitive targets and their acquirers is 0.605 (Appendix Table A.3).
By definition, the acquisitive target would not be able to acquire its acquirer given it is smaller. Yet, as
they make new acquisitions, acquisitive firms are growing. In this sub-section, we first get a sense of
the time it would take for the acquisitive target to achieve a sufficient size to acquire its acquirer. We
then study the likelihood of being acquired as a function of the size of other firms.
First, we investigate the size evolution of the acquisitive targets in the past three years to gain a
better understanding of the build-up speed of these firms. We measure the size of the acquisitive target
one month prior to each of the acquisition and measure its size growth from one acquisition to the next.
In untabulated results, we find that the average size growth rate per deal is 27% across all
previous acquisitions. Since the acquisitive target is already two thirds of the size of the acquirer, the
acquirer is just two acquisitions away. Further, the average time period between two consecutive
acquisitions made by the acquisitive target is 6 months. It implies that if the acquirer leaves the
acquisitive target unchecked, it could become its target in the next 12 months.
These results indicate that acquisitive targets are more threatening because they are growing fast,
and would soon be larger than their current acquirer. To complete this picture, we study whether a
company is under more threat to be acquired when there are more companies that are slightly larger.
The idea is that the acquisitive target might soon become ‘slightly larger’, but is this the type of firms
that constitute a threat?
Table 5 shows the results from Logit regressions that model the probability of a given firm being
acquired in a given year.21 As explanatory variables, we add the ‘fraction of firms that are larger but less
than 1.25 times larger’, the ‘fraction of firms that are between 1.25 and 1.5 times larger’ etc. We find
that when the fraction of slightly ‘larger firms’ increases, the probability of being acquired significantly
21 The first major paper to study this is Palepu (1986) and we use his 9 explanatory variables in our regressions.
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increases (specification 1). The more narrowly do we define ‘slightly’ larger, the stronger the effect.22
The fraction of much larger firms (those that are more than 4 times larger) is, in contrast, negatively
related to the probability of being acquired; and the fraction of smaller firms is not significant. This
shows that the threat comes from firms that are slightly larger, not those that are out of reach (or those
that are smaller). The effect appears to be very large both economically and statistically. The fraction of
firms that are slightly larger and the faction of firms that are much larger appear to be the main driver of
the likelihood of being acquired for any firm in any year. The result holds also when we include the
time-industry fixed effects (specifications 5-8). We believe this result on the likelihood for any firm to
be acquired on a given year is novel and interesting per se.
<Table 5>
Further, we examine whether firms that made previous acquisitions are more likely to do new
acquisitions. In Table 6 Panel A, we show the fraction of acquirers that make a new acquisition in the
next one/three years. We break down the statistics by the number of acquisitions the firm has made over
the previous three years. We find a monotone and steep relationship. If the firm has not made any
acquisition over the preceding three years, then the probability of making a new acquisition over the
following year is 19%. This probability increases up to 68% when the firm has made 5 or more
acquisitions over the preceding three years. Results are similar if we look at the next three years instead
of the one year window.
<Table 6>
In Panel B, we run Logit regressions similar to those in Table 5 but change the dependent
variable from the probability of being acquired to the probability of acquiring a firm. The first variable
of interest here is the number of deals made in the past three years. The results are significantly positive
22 Note: We do not include all the buckets at the same time because of severe multicollinearity issue if we do so.
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at the 1% level test. This shows that firms that performed previous acquisitions are indeed more likely
to make new acquisitions and thus impose a credible threat to other firms.
It is also interesting and important to study whether the firms that fail to acquire an acquisitive
target end up being acquired by the firm that they targeted. In the data we found only one such case.
While this is surprising at first sight, we argue that this may be an equilibrium outcome. The idea is that
if a firm failed to acquire an acquisitive company then it should not remain passive and wait for its fate
but instead acquire another firm to get out of reach of the acquisitive company.23
This idea is empirically testable by looking at whether firms that try but fail to acquire an
acquisitive target have a higher propensity to acquire another firm soon after. We find strong empirical
support. 70% of the 424 companies that tried but failed to acquire an acquisitive target made a new
acquisition attempt over the next three years. The proportion increases monotonically with the number
of target’s prior acquisitions. A whopping 85% of the companies that tried but failed to acquire a firm
that made five or more prior acquisitions, made another acquisition over the next three years (non-
tabulated). Table 6 – Panel B shows these results in a multiple regressions setting. Specification 2
shows that firms that have failed more acquisitions in the past have a significantly higher likelihood of
making a new acquisition. Specification 3 tests the above view more directly. We find that it is the
number of failed acquisitions of acquisitive companies that is significant, while the number of failed
non-acquisitive companies is not.24 These results fit well with our story and are difficult to explain
otherwise.
23 Consider the following example: there are four firms labelled A, B, C and D. Their respective size is 100, 70, 50, 25.
Assume that firm C acquires firm D and its size is now 75. Firm B cannot acquire anymore because it is now the smallest. If
firm C acquires firm B then it can next acquire firm A. Firm A is under threat and can try to acquire firm C to avoid being
eaten. Let’s suppose it tries but fails to do so. As you point out, we may expect to see firm C acquiring firm A at some point
in the future (once it has become sufficiently large). However, firm A may not stay passive. Its optimal response is to acquire
firm B. In this case, there will be two firms in the economy: Firm A with a size of 170 and firm C with a size of 75. Hence,
instead of waiting for its fate, firm A is more likely to acquire another company and to be out of reach from firm C.
24 Note: we need to restrict the sample to firms that attempted an acquisition (whether they failed or not) for specification 3.
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Directly related to this issue, we also look at the survival rate of these companies that acquire an
acquisitive target. Table 7 Panel A shows that companies which try but fail to acquire an acquisitive
firm have one-in-five chances of being acquired over the next three years. In contrast, for companies
which try and succeed in acquiring an acquisitive firm the chances of being acquired is only one-in-ten.
Importantly, for companies which try to acquire a non-acquisitive firm, the chance of being acquired is
similar, irrespective of whether they fail or succeed at their bids.
<Table 7>
In Panel B, we show results from a Logit regression in which the dependent variable is one if the
acquirer is acquired over the next three years and zero otherwise. We use the same sample as in Table 4
and the same three specifications. The above results hold in this context as well. When an acquirer tries
but fails to acquire an acquisitive firm, its likelihood of being acquired is significantly higher. The
coefficients are statistically different at the 1% level test. Firms that try but fail to acquire an acquisitive
target are more likely to be acquired than those firms that try but fail to acquire a non-acquisitive target.
Hence, acquiring an acquisitive firm seems effective at reducing the chances of being acquired.
To sum up, we find that acquisitive targets would have soon been slightly larger than their
acquirers and the fraction of slightly larger firms in the economy is the primary determinant of the
likelihood of being acquired. Further, acquisitive firms have a higher propensity to acquire. This means
that among those slightly larger firms, the acquisitive ones are those most likely to make an acquisition.
In addition, acquirers who fail to acquire an acquisitive firm are more likely to be acquired in the future,
while it is not the case for those failing to acquire a non-acquisitive firm; acquirers who fail to acquire
an acquisitive firm are more likely to make another acquisition attempt in the near future. Taken
together, this constitutes a new body of empirical evidence indicating that acquisitive targets were a
likely threat to their acquirers.
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4.3. Further empirical tests: Sub-sample evidence
The neo-agency view offers a few empirical predictions in sub-samples of acquisitions. The most
obvious one is that the effect should be more pronounced when acquiring managers have more private
benefits. To test this, we use two common corporate governance measures: the corporate governance
index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and the equity ownership of directors and officers (D&Os)
as in Cai and Sevilir (2012). We split the sample into ‘dictatorship’ (GIM index of the acquirer is 10 or
more) and ‘democracy’ acquirers (GIM index of the acquirer is 9 or less), and run our main
specification for each sub-sample. Similarly, we split our sample into two groups based on the equity
ownership of acquirer’s directors and officers (D&Os) being above or below the median. Results are
shown in Table 8. The effect is significant only for ‘dictatorship’ acquirers and acquirers with below
median equity ownership.
An insight of Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009) is that the likelihood of a defensive acquisition
depends on the distribution of firm size in an industry. Basically, highly concentrated industries, i.e.
those dominated by a few large firms, should not be prone to defensive acquisition.25 The most natural
and common proxy for industry concentration is probably the Herfindahl index. We split the sample
into two equal groups based on the Herfindahl index. Consistent with the theory, we find that the effect
is significant only for the low-concentration industries.
25 We can illustrate this in a simple setting by comparing two industries of five firms each. Industry A has firm sizes
distributed as follows: 10 (firm A1), 20 (firm A2), 30 (firm A3), 40 (firm A4) and 50 (firm A5); while industry B firm sizes
are respectively: 10 (firm B1), 15 (firm B2), 20 (firm B3), 25 (firm B4), and 80 (firm B5). The total size is the same for each
industry but industry B is dominated by a large company. If firm A3 eats A2 then A5 needs to eat A3 for defensive reasons.
Otherwise, A3 eats either A1 or A4 next and can then move on to A5. A5 thus needs to eat the acquisitive firm immediately,
before itself gets eaten (A5 could also eat A4 to protect itself, but if there are more firms than in this simple example, it is
more efficient and cost effective for A5 to eat the acquisitive-firm directly because the acquisitive-firm will keep on buying,
forcing A5 to keep on buying too). Once A3 is eaten, the acquisitive-firm is dead and A5 has no need to make further
defensive acquisitions. If the same happens in industry B, i.e., if B3 eats B2, then even if B3 eats B4 (or B1 or both), B5 is
still not seriously threatened and will, therefore, not be pressurized to acquire the acquisitive firm.
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Another prediction coming from the theory is that the effect should be stronger when the
acquirer and target are from the same industry, and we find it to be the case. Finally, defensive
acquisitions should be more likely when the size of the target is close to that of the acquirer. We find
this is also the case.
< Table 8 >
5. Alternative Explanations
While our evidence above supports the neo-agency view of takeovers, there are other potential
explanations which we discuss and test in this section.
5.1. Differences in bargaining power
Results could be driven by differences in bargaining power between the acquirer and the target. To test
this hypothesis, we use five different proxies. First, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) argue that: “the
market-to-book ratios of the bidder and target are determined by the relative bargaining power of each
party during the merger negotiation.” Our proxy for relative bargaining power is then set to target’s
market-to-book ratio divided by acquirer’s market-to-book ratio.
Second, Stulz (1988) and Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990) argue that an acquirer with a larger
toehold have a stronger bargaining position. Third, if an acquisition is competed, the target chooses its
acquirer and thus has more bargaining power. Fourth, the existence of target termination fees may be
interpreted as a sign that the target has higher bargaining power.26 Fifth, acquisitive targets may have
learnt from past acquisitions. Having been on the other side of the table several times may have taught
26 For example, Ahern (2012) writes: “Target firms often commit to a negotiation strategy through the use of termination
fees by imposing costs on themselves if they reject a bidder’s offer. These commitments theoretically lead to more
aggressive bidding by acquirers (Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song, 2005; Povel and Singh, 2006) and hence greater bargaining
power for targets. Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis (Officer, 2003; Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone and
Mulherin, 2006).”
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them the ropes of the M&A business. Thus, a high premium earned by an acquisitive target could proxy
for its bargaining power/skills. Results are reported in Table 9. It shows that our central result holds
after controlling for any of these variables.
<Table 9>
5.2. Quality of corporate governance
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find that acquirers’ announcement returns differ significantly given the
differences in the quality of corporate governance: ‘Democracy’ acquirers experience positive
announcement returns, while ‘Dictatorship’ acquirers experience negative announcement returns.
To account for the quality of acquirer’s corporate governance, we use three different measures: i)
the corporate governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); ii) the entrenchment index of
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009); and iii) managerial equity ownership (Stulz, 1988; Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1988). 27 Results are shown in Table 10. We find that accounting for the quality of
corporate governance does not alter our main results.
<Table 10>
5.3. Competition for market share
Since the target has been growing in market shares thanks to its past acquisitions, the acquirer may
acquire the acquisitive target, not because it is afraid of being acquired later on but because it is
‘concerned’ about this acquisitive company’s building up of its market share. In addition, when this
‘market share concern’ becomes the rationale for the acquisition, the stock market may react negatively.
The reason could be that such a ‘concern’ is not necessarily consistent with value-maximization. This
model generates empirical predictions that are consistent with most of our results. We then run a horse
race between ‘target pre3YR num of deals’ and the target market share growth over the preceding three
27 As in Cai and Sevilir (2012), among others, we measure managerial equity ownership by the fraction of equity held by
directors and officers.
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years. We can also use the difference in market share growth between the target and the acquirer, as this
measures the relative growth rate between the two.
For each target and acquirer, we calculate its average annual industry-adjusted sales growth over
the preceding three years. Results are reported in Table 11. We find that the difference in sales growth
is indeed statistically significant. If the target has been growing its sales faster than the acquirer, then
the market reacts more negatively to the acquisition. Our main results are, however, unaffected by these
market share controls.
<Table 11>
5.4. Hubris and learning hypotheses
Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis argues that overconfident managers overpay when making acquisitions.
Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident managers make more acquisitions which earn 
lower announcement returns. Acquisitive firms may be run by CEOs who resist more to takeovers (as
shown earlier) and, thus, only overconfident CEOs attempt to acquire acquisitive firms. In a similar
context, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) examine this hypothesis by looking at the
determinants of takeover premiums, thereby testing whether a certain type of acquirer (larger ones in
their paper) overpay. We test whether takeover premiums increase with the number of target’s past
acquisitions.
We also test a “learning” hypothesis by looking at the takeover premium. Acquisitive firms may
have learnt from past acquisitions and become more experienced at deal bargaining. This could explain
why, when the target is an acquisitive firm, takeovers are more likely to fail (it knows how to resist) and
announcement returns are lower (it obtains a better price).
We run the same specifications as in Table 3 but with takeover premium as the dependent
variable. Results are shown in Appendix Table A.6. We find no significant relation between a target’s
past acquisition activity and takeover premium.
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6. Robustness
To carry out the robustness tests, we choose the third specification of Table 3: the one including most
covariates.28 Table 12 presents the results for each robustness test. In order to fit them all in one table,
we show only the coefficient of our main variable (labeled as “Acquisitive effect”), which is the
coefficient on “Target’s pre3YR num of deals” unless specified otherwise. The first specification is the
one from Table 3 (Specification 3), and it is taken as the ‘default results’.
< Table 12 >
6.1. Robustness to changing control variables
6.1.1. Is the effect distinct from firm size and scope?
Since firms that made prior acquisitions are larger, it is natural to wonder whether our main variable
acts simply as a proxy for firm size. In the same vein, firms that made past acquisitions tend to have had
a higher past growth in assets and more market segments (i.e., be more like a conglomerate). We ought
to verify that it is not one of these dimensions that our variable is picking up.
One concern is that we may pick up a non-linear effect in firm size. For example, our variable
could capture “mega-deals” as proposed by Bayazitova, Kahl, and Valkanov (2012).29 We show that
our variable is not affected when controlling for “mega-deal.”
A firm that made prior acquisitions could be more like a conglomerate, i.e., to have more
business segments. Since prior research has identified a conglomerate discount (e.g., Lang and Stulz,
1994), acquiring a conglomerate may lead to a decrease in the value of the acquirer (all else equal).
Following the conglomerate literature, we use the “Segment Identifier” in Compustat to control for
28 As noted above, the coefficient of our main variable is very stable across specifications. Hence, this choice has no material
impact on the outcome of the robustness tests.
29 “Mega-deal” is a dummy variable that is one if the merger is in the top 1% of absolute deal size, and zero otherwise. We
have also used target size instead of deal value and found similar results.
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target’s number of business segments. We show that adding such a control variable does not alter our
results.
A firm that made prior acquisitions is likely to go through a period of higher asset growth. Since
asset growth is related to a number of patterns in corporate finance (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Schill,
2008), we add it as a control variable. We find that it does not affect our results.30
6.1.2. Merger waves and announcement returns
The importance of merger waves has been emphasized extensively (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996;
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004;
Harford, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Duchin and Schmidt, 2012; and
Ahern and Harford, 2014). Although we control for year-industry fixed effects, our findings could still
be driven by a wave effect. When a wave occurs, a sub-set of the firms makes more acquisitions and
then gets acquired, and this may be at times when announcement returns for that sub-set of firms are
low for some reasons.
Cai, Song, and Walkling (2011) add to a standard set of control variables three wave variables
based on Harford (2005) classification: i) Pre-wave is a dummy variable that equals one if the bid
occurs in the 12 months before the start of a Harford wave (zero otherwise), ii) In-wave is a dummy
variable that equals one if the bid occurs within 24 months of the start of a Harford wave (zero
otherwise), and iii) Post-wave is a dummy variable that equals one for bids that occur within 36 months
after the end of a Harford wave (zero otherwise). We expand our analysis by adding these three
explanatory variables to the default regression.
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) propose another approach to identify waves (see, e.g., Goel
and Thakor, 2010, for an implementation). This approach provides an indicator that shows whether a
30 The full regression results for this sub-section are reported in Appendix Table A.4.
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month is classified as pre-, in-, or post-wave. We conduct a more stringent test which encompasses this
Bouwman-Fuller-Nain wave variable and consists of adding month (instead of year) fixed effects.
The statistical significance of our main variable is not affected when we make any of these
changes.
6.2. Robustness to methodological choices
We had to make several empirical choices in our analysis. Although we strive to follow the most
ubiquitous choices, it is apparent that different studies use different conventions. In this sub-section, we
show results when we change each element of our approach to the most frequently encountered
alternative in the literature.
In the main analysis, we count past acquisitions over a three-year window following Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). Results for a five-year window are similar, albeit with a higher t-
statistic. We also find strong results when using a longer announcement window of plus or minus 2 days
(as in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011; and Golubov, Petmezas, and
Travlos, 2012). Results are also similar if we use the CRSP value-weighted index (as opposed to the
equally-weighted one) as the market return; and if we calculate the announcement return by using the
market-adjusted model (i.e., assuming a=0 and ß=1 as market model parameters, as in Fuller, Netter,
and Stegemoller, 2002). Results are also similar if we winsorize returns at the 5th and 95th percentile to
reduce the influence of outliers.
We also consider alternative proxies for target acquisitiveness. Instead of “Target’s pre3YR num
of deals”, we now use “Target’s pre3YR value of deals” and a dummy variable called “Acquisitive
target” that equals one if the target is acquisitive and zero otherwise. These alternative proxies are also
statistically significant at the 1% level test.
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Petersen (2009) argues for the use of double clustering on year and firm when dealing with a
typical finance panel dataset. In contrast to most finance datasets, the same firm does not appear every
year in our sample and therefore we opted for clustering by year only in our main analysis. Here, we
show results with double clustering on year and firm. We observe that the t-statistics (for our variable)
are similar independent of the clustering or standard error method.
6.3. Robustness to sample choices
In this sub-section, we show results for several alternative samples to further assess the
robustness of our findings. First, we count all of the target’s past acquisition attempts (both successful
and failed) instead of just the completed ones. Again, the results are similar to those of our main
analysis. Second, we note that the literature diverges in terms of the definition of an acquisition. We
have followed the definition of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) who require that all target
shares are purchased. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), among others, examine acquisitions in
which acquirers obtain more than 50% of the target firm (i.e., a majority stake). This change to sample
selection is significant, since it mechanically increases the number of prior acquisitions made by the
target and slightly increases the sample size, with the number of observations rising to 4,269, up from
4,111. Despite this, our main result is virtually unaffected.
We also show results separately: (1) for the sub-set for which the method of payment is stock
and (2) for the sub-set for which the method of payment is either cash or cash and stock mixed. In these
two sub-sets of similar size the acquisitive-firm effect is significant at the 1% level. In terms of
economic magnitude, the effect is about twice as large for the ‘stock’ sub-set.
Next, we divide our sample into three time periods: the pre big-wave period (1985-1997), the
big-wave period (1998-2000), and the post big-wave period (2001-2010). This choice is motivated by
the observations of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008),
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which show that the 1998-2000 period is special due to its exceptionally low announcement returns and
high acquisition volumes. Despite this, we find that results are stable across these sub-periods.
Several studies exclude acquisitions made by banking and utility firms (e.g., Fuller, Netter, and
Stegemoller, 2002; Cai, Song, and Walkling, 2007). Reasons usually include the different regulatory
environment and the different amount of leverage found in these industries. We find that excluding
these acquisitions marginally strengthens our result. We also show that results are similar if we exclude
conglomerate deals and ‘rest of the industries’ deals (Appendix Table A.2) from the analysis.
Finally, we expand our sample by including targets that are not publicly listed. This sample, as
shown in Table 1, contains 19,262 acquisitions. We expand our analysis by adding two explanatory
variables to the default regression: i) a dummy variable that equals one if the target is a private firm and
zero otherwise; and ii) a dummy variable that equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm and zero
otherwise. Our main variable is significantly negative at the 1% level test.
In Table 12 Panel B, we repeat the same robustness tests with the results relating to the
probability of acquisition success except for tests related to the computation of abnormal returns as they
are not relevant here. We find that the acquisitive-firm effect is robust to any of the changes made.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we show that a key driver of acquirer announcement returns and acquisition success is the
number of past acquisitions made by the target. The announcement returns decrease monotonically with
the number of target’s past acquisitions, reaching -6.22% when the target has made five or more
acquisitions over the preceding three years. Further, the more acquisitions made by the target, the more
likely the acquirer is to fail its acquisition attempt. These findings persist when standard control
variables are included in the regression analysis and remain robust to changes in methodological and
sample selection choices.
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The recent “eat or be eaten” theory seems to be consistent with these results. A manager,
concerned with the potential loss of private benefits of control, wants to acquire the acquisitive firm
before that firm becomes larger and her company ends up being next on the list. Thus, the company
‘eats in order not to be eaten.’ Acquiring an acquirer is, therefore, more likely to be motivated by the
preservation of private benefits of control rather than increase in firm value. This would explain why
these acquisitions have lower announcement returns and why an attempt to take over an acquisitive firm
is more likely to fail.
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Figure 1: Acquirer announcement returns and the number of acquisitions made by the target
This figure shows the average announcement returns for shareholders of acquiring firms as a function of the
number of acquisitions made by the target over the previous three years. Announcement returns are measured
as the cumulative abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the announcement date, as in Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). The sample comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that
acquired a US public firm (Target) between 1985 and 2010.
-0.51%
-1.67% -1.69%
-3.39%
-3.72%
-6.22%
-7.00%
-6.00%
-5.00%
-4.00%
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
0 1 2 3 4 5+
Av
er
ag
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
tr
et
ur
ns
Target pre3YR num of deals
33
Figure 2: Time series development for the Firstar-Mercantile deal
This figure illustrates the time series development of the Firstar-Mercantile deal. In the first stage, Mercantile Bancorporation (the acquisitive target)
successfully acquires twelve targets within a three-year event window and the sum of the announcement returns for those deals was -8.39%. In the second
stage, the acquisitive target itself is targeted and acquired by Firstar Corporation. The announcement return for each deal is reported in parentheses,
which is measured as the cumulative abnormal return from one day before to one day after the announcement date, as in Moeller, Schlingemann, and
Stulz (2004).
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Table 1: Sample selection and announcement returns
This table shows descriptive statistics for four samples. The “full sample of acquisitions” is obtained from the
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database (as of December 2010) after
applying the following six criteria: (1) acquisitions in which the acquiring firm ends up with all the shares of
the target, and the acquiring firm controls less than 50% of the shares of the target firm before the
announcement; (2) the transaction is completed; (3) the deal value is greater than $1 million; (4) the number of
days between the announcement and completion dates is between zero and one thousand; (5) the target is a
public or a private firm or a non-public subsidiary of a public or private firm; (6) both the acquirer and the
target are based in the US. The next sample is obtained by adding the following three criteria: (7) the acquirer
is a public firm listed on both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat during the
event window; (8) the deal value relative to the market value of the acquirer is no less than 1%; and (9) the
acquisition is made in 1985 or later. This sample gets split in two sub-samples based on whether the target is
publicly listed or not. For each sample, the following statistics are displayed: the number of acquisitions,
average announcement returns (when available for all observations), the fraction of acquirers that got acquired
over the following three or five years, and the fraction of targets that made at least one acquisition over the
preceding three or five years.
Number of
acquisitions
Average
announcement returns
Fraction of targets that made
an acquisition over the past
three years five years
Full sample of acquisitions 53,798 n.a. 4% 4%
Full sample of acquisitions matched
to CRSP and Compustat 19,262 1.41%a 7% 9%
. Sub-sample of non-public targets 14,976 2.10%a 1% 1%
. Sub-sample of public targets 4,286 -0.98%a 27% 35%
a significant at 1%.
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Table 2: Target acquisitiveness and announcement returns
This table shows the average announcement returns for the acquirer as a function of the number of prior
acquisitions made by the target. The sample comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that
acquired a US public firm (Target) between 1985 and 2010. Announcement returns are measured as the
cumulative abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the announcement date, as in Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004).
Number of acquisitions made by
the target over the last three years
Number of
observations
Fraction of
the sample
Average
announcement returns
No acquisition 3,122 73% -0.51%a
One acquisition 676 16% -1.67%a
Two acquisitions 236 6% -1.69%a
Three acquisitions 124 3% -3.39%a
Four acquisitions 53 1% -3.72%a
Five or more acquisitions 75 2% -6.22%a
a significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Determinants of acquirer announcement returns
This table shows results from OLS regressions with acquirer announcement return as the dependent variable.
The sample comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm
(Target) between 1985 and 2010. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only
variables that are at least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. “Other deal characteristics”
includes: toehold (1/0), conglomerate (1/0), tender offer (1/0), hostile (1/0), competed (1/0), and acquirer
pre3YR num of deals (log). “Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q and acquirer cash-to-
asset ratio. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the
corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.0134a -0.0131a -0.0133a
(-4.84) (-5.06) (-3.95)
Acquirer size (log) -0.0037a -0.0020 0.0003
(-2.86) (-1.59) (0.20)
Relative size 0.0044b 0.0043b 0.0033
(2.57) (2.44) (1.40)
All cash deal (1/0) 0.0187a 0.0202a 0.0207a
(4.83) (5.37) (3.60)
All stock deal (1/0) -0.0092b -0.0081b -0.0073
(-2.30) (-2.15) (-1.61)
Dormant period >1 year (1/0) 0.0101b 0.0116b 0.0048
(2.22) (2.14) (0.54)
Acquirer price run-up -0.0137a -0.0114a -0.0147a
(-3.65) (-3.04) (-2.96)
Acquirer sigma 0.0343 0.0592b 0.1007b
(1.53) (2.22) (2.68)
Acquirer leverage 0.0155b 0.0445a
(2.43) (3.33)
Acquirer past asset growth -0.0135a -0.0197a
(-3.34) (-3.50)
Constant 0.0051 -0.0173 -0.0249
(0.47) (-1.22) (-1.12)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics No Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects No No Yes
Number of Observations 4,286 4,111 4,111
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.067 0.096
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Determinants of the probability of deal success
This table shows results from Logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals
one if the bid is classified by SDC as successful, and zero otherwise. The sample contains all offers made by
public firms (Acquirer) to acquire other public firms (Target) in the US between 1985 and 2010. All variables
used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at least once significant at a 5%
level test are shown in the table. “Other deal characteristics” includes: all stock deal (1/0) and toehold (1/0).
“Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q and acquirer cash-to-asset ratio. Standard errors
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding z-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.6864a -0.6773a -0.8363a
(-8.43) (-7.82) (-7.76)
Acquirer size (log) 0.1351a 0.1536a 0.1804a
(5.31) (6.17) (4.94)
Relative size -0.0538c -0.0670b -0.0629
(-1.92) (-2.03) (-1.33)
All cash deal (1/0) -1.2566a -1.2936a -1.6425a
(-6.81) (-6.34) (-7.03)
Dormant period >1 year (1/0) -0.2529a -0.2392b 0.0227
(-2.87) (-2.51) (0.14)
Conglomerate (1/0) 0.1788c 0.2378b 0.4287a
(1.74) (2.33) (2.66)
Tender offer (1/0) 1.2422a 1.2720a 1.6355a
(6.94) (6.68) (7.32)
Hostile (1/0) -2.5266a -2.5133a -2.8094a
(-12.10) (-11.72) (-9.45)
Competed (1/0) -0.7158a -0.7470a -0.5622a
(-4.89) (-5.64) (-3.65)
Acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log) 0.2301a 0.2244a 0.1136
(4.09) (3.82) (1.50)
Acquirer price run-up 0.1090 0.1169c 0.2126b
(1.61) (1.74) (2.53)
Acquirer sigma -1.1524a -1.1958a -1.4310a
(-3.52) (-3.52) (-3.98)
Acquirer leverage 0.3854b -0.0318
(2.23) (-0.09)
Acquirer past asset growth 1.1899b 3.1611c
(2.33) (1.74)
Constant 1.2441a 0.8974a 0.3439
(4.41) (2.96) (0.78)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics No Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 5,527 5,297 4,440
Pseudo R-squared 0.149 0.155 0.263
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 5: The probability of being acquired
This table shows results from Logistic regressions that model the probability of a given firm being acquired in a given year. The sample contains all US public firms
in the Compustat database between 1984 and 2009. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is acquired in the next twelve months from
the end of a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise. For each firm in each fiscal year, we measure the fraction of firms that are (1) larger but less than 1.25 times larger,
(2) between 1.25 and 1.5 times larger, (3) between 1.5 and 2 times larger, (4) between 2 and 4 times larger, (5) more than 4 times larger, or (6) smaller but more than
0.1 times larger. Following Palepu (1986), we use the following control variables in all regressions: Return on equity, Growth, Liquidity, Leverage, Growth resource
(1/0), Industry (1/0), Size, Market-to-book ratio, and Price-earnings ratio. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at
least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. “Other control variables” includes: return on equity, growth, liquidity, leverage, market-to-book ratio,
and price-earnings ratio. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6 Spec 7 Spec 8
Fraction of firms that are larger; but less than 1.25 times larger 0.2573a 0.2216a
(5.18) (5.23)
Fraction of firms that are between 1.25 and 1.5 times larger 0.2591a 0.2186a
(4.12) (3.85)
Fraction of firms that are between 1.5 and 2 times larger 0.2074a 0.1794a
(4.66) (4.54)
Fraction of firms that are between 2 and 4 times larger 0.0937a 0.0812a
(5.24) (5.44)
Fraction of firms that are more than 4 times larger -0.0185a -0.0175a -0.0213a -0.0244a -0.0180a -0.0170a -0.0205a -0.0231a
(-5.97) (-5.38) (-5.67) (-6.16) (-6.21) (-5.63) (-5.87) (-6.31)
Fraction of firms that are smaller; but more than 0.1 times larger 0.0104 0.0166c 0.0130 0.0162b 0.0101 0.0158b 0.0124 0.0152b
(1.22) (1.91) (1.42) (2.06) (1.32) (2.02) (1.52) (2.21)
Growth resource (1/0) -0.0358 -0.0362 -0.0357 -0.0376 -0.0837b -0.0837b -0.0837b -0.0846b
(-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.66) (-0.70) (-2.13) (-2.13) (-2.13) (-2.15)
Industry (1/0) 0.6131a 0.6132a 0.6129a 0.6128a 0.3024a 0.3020a 0.3025a 0.3026a
(8.83) (8.79) (8.85) (8.84) (5.10) (5.09) (5.11) (5.10)
Firm size -0.0136b -0.0127b -0.0134b -0.0131b -0.0142b -0.0133b -0.0140b -0.0137b
(-2.11) (-2.09) (-2.12) (-2.13) (-2.45) (-2.45) (-2.48) (-2.49)
Constant -5.0940a -5.1594a -5.0896a -5.1075a -4.1165a -4.1871a -4.1211a -4.1306a
(-19.48) (-19.42) (-18.67) (-19.33) (-22.38) (-22.91) (-21.21) (-22.40)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 153,950 153,950 153,950 153,950 122,120 122,120 122,120 122,120
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 6: Are acquisitive firms more likely to do new acquisitions?
Panel A shows the fraction of companies making an acquisition in the next 1 (3) year following an acquisition.
The sample comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm
(Target) between 1985 and 2010. Deals are sorted based on the number of acquisitions made in the preceding
three years. Panel B shows results from Logistic regressions that model the probability of a given firm
acquiring a firm in a given year. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm acquires
a company in next twelve months from the end of a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise. No. of deals made in
pre3YR (log) is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of acquisitions made by the acquirer over the
past three years. The counting is performed on the sample of public targets. No. of failed acquisitive deals
made in pre3YR (log) is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of failed acquisitions of acquisitive
companies over the past three years. Control variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that
are at least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. “Other control variables” includes: return
on equity, growth, liquidity, leverage, growth resource (1/0), and market-to-book ratio. Standard errors are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding z-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
Panel A: Simple statistics
Number of acquisitions made
by the acquirer in the past
three years preceding the deal Number of firms
Fraction of firms making
another deal in the next
One year Three years
No acquisition 1,669 19% 38%
One acquisition 1,023 29% 52%
Two acquisitions 562 40% 64%
Three acquisitions 345 52% 74%
Four acquisitions 244 57% 79%
Five or more acquisitions 443 68% 83%
Panel B: Logit regression: Probability of acquiring a firm
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6
No. of deals made in pre3YR (log) 2.0555a 1.9321a 2.0435a 1.9290a
(35.11) (31.26) (34.79) (30.33)
No. of failed deals made in pre3YR (log) 1.3432a 1.3757a
(13.54) (13.03)
No. of failed acquisitive deals made in pre3YR (log) 0.3585b 0.3342b
(2.17) (2.13)
No. of failed non-acquisitive deals made -0.1037 -0.0983
in pre3YR (log) (-0.66) (-0.48)
Leverage 0.0006 0.0006 0.0021b 0.0007 0.0007 0.0040b
(0.58) (0.56) (2.11) (0.55) (0.54) (2.15)
Industry (1/0) 0.7594a 0.7555a 0.9011a 0.5830a 0.5759a 0.5351c
(9.15) (9.08) (4.59) (7.41) (7.37) (1.92)
Firm size 0.0087a 0.0086a 0.0087a 0.0109a 0.0108a 0.0098a
(6.25) (6.18) (4.11) (7.46) (7.59) (4.51)
Price-earnings ratio 0.0003a 0.0003a -0.0004b 0.0004b 0.0003b -0.0005a
(5.17) (4.80) (-2.42) (2.52) (2.38) (-3.20)
Constant -4.8086a -4.8258a -3.3208a -3.9843a -4.0081a -1.4250a
(-47.47) (-47.50) (-17.77) (-51.29) (-50.75) (-5.73)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 153,950 153,950 8,133 126,922 126,922 5,023
Pseudo R-squared 0.047 0.051 0.019 0.080 0.084 0.084
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
40
Table 7: Acquirer survival
Panel A of this table shows the number and fraction of companies that get acquired in the next 3 years and 5
years after they attempted an acquisition. An acquisitive firm is a company that made at least one acquisition
over the past three years. Panel B shows results from Logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that equals one if the acquirer is acquired over the three years following the announcement of an
acquisition, and zero otherwise. The sample contains all offers made by public firms (Acquirer) to acquire
other public firms (Target) in the US between 1985 and 2010. All variables used in the table are defined in
Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table.
“Other deal characteristics” includes: relative size, all cash deal (1/0), toehold (1/0), dormant period >1 year
(1/0), tender offer (1/0), hostile (1/0), competed (1/0), acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log), and acquirer price
run-up. “Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q, acquirer leverage, acquirer cash-to-asset
ratio, and acquirer past asset growth. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by
acquisition year; the corresponding z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Simple statistics
Fraction of companies that get acquired in the next 3 years 5 years
N_obs Fraction N_obs Fraction
After it successfully acquired an acquisitive target 109 10% 167 16%
After it tried but failed to acquire an acquisitive target 87 21% 108 26%
After it successfully acquired a non-acquisitive target 348 12% 527 19%
After it tried but failed to acquire a non-acquisitive target 101 14% 149 21%
Panel B: Logistic regression analysis, dependent variable is “Acquirer getting acquired (1/0)”
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Tried but failed to acquire an acquisitive target (1/0) 0.7194a 0.7685a 1.0335a
(5.03) (5.62) (5.24)
Tried but failed to acquire a non-acquisitive target (1/0) 0.1778 0.1835 0.5150a
(1.48) (1.53) (3.58)
Successfully acquired an acquisitive target (1/0) -0.0314 -0.0123 -0.0801
(-0.28) (-0.11) (-0.56)
Acquirer size (log) -0.1504a -0.1404a -0.0926a
(-6.12) (-4.85) (-2.82)
All stock deal (1/0) -0.0226 -0.0457 -0.4030a
(-0.21) (-0.48) (-3.18)
Conglomerate (1/0) -0.3700a -0.3485a -0.1289
(-3.19) (-2.86) (-0.79)
Acquirer sigma -1.1117a -0.8575a -0.7689
(-3.93) (-2.60) (-1.57)
Constant -0.7914a -1.1738a -1.7044a
(-3.23) (-3.02) (-3.24)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics No Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 5,527 5,297 3,302
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.027 0.096
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 8: Sub-sample analyses
This table shows results from OLS regressions with acquirer announcement return as the dependent variable.
The full sample comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm
(Target) between 1985 and 2010. We split the sample into 5 sets of subsamples: (1) dictatorship (the GIM
index of the acquirer is 10 or more); (2) democracy (the GIM index of the acquirer is 9 or less); (3) low
ownership (the equity ownership of the acquirer D&Os is below the sample median); (4) high ownership (the
equity ownership of the acquirer D&Os is above the sample median); (5) low concentration (the industry
Herfindahl index is below the sample median); (6) high concentration (the industry Herfindahl index is above
the sample median); (7) same industry deal (if the current deal is not a conglomerate); (8) conglomerate deal *
target conglomerate before (if the current deal is a conglomerate and the target has made a conglomerate deal
before); (9) conglomerate deal * target non-conglomerate before (if the deal is a conglomerate and the target
has never made a conglomerate deal before); (10) large relative size (the deal value compared to acquirer size
is above the sample median); (11) small relative size (the deal value compared to acquirer size is below the
sample median). The specification used is always the same as specification 3 in Table 3. Subsamples (5) and
(6) are restricted to non-conglomerate deals. The ‘acquisitive effect’ refers to the coefficient of “Target
pre3YR num of deals (log)”. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
Acquisitive
effect t-statistics
Control
variables
Adjusted
R-square
Number of
observations
Level of corporate governance
. Dictatorship -0.0111b (-2.52) Yes 0.116 773
. Democracy -0.0030 (-0.50) Yes 0.051 775
Equity ownership of the director & officers (D&Os)
. Low ownership -0.0218a (-3.11) Yes 0.147 470
. High ownership -0.0109 (-1.05) Yes 0.104 473
Level of industry concentration
. Low concentration -0.0169a (-3.58) Yes 0.213 1,710
. High concentration -0.0104 (-1.21) Yes 0.030 1,125
Deal is a conglomerate or not
. Same industry deal -0.0129a (-3.25) Yes 0.166 2,802
. Conglomerate deal * target conglomerate before -0.0339b (-2.42) Yes 0.154 198
. Conglomerate deal * target non-conglomerate before -0.0124 (-0.75) Yes -0.037 1,111
Deal value compared to acquirer size
. Large relative size -0.0128b (-2.02) Yes 0.215 2,025
. Small relative size -0.0005 (-0.10) Yes 0.097 2,086
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 9: Differences in bargaining power
This table shows results from OLS regressions with acquirer announcement return as the dependent variable
(Panel A) and from Logistic regressions with the dependent variable that equals one if the bid is classified by
SDC as successful, and zero otherwise (Panel B). The sample in Panel A comprises 4,286 observations of US
public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm (Target) between 1985 and 2010. The sample in Panel
B contains all offers made by public firms (Acquirer) to acquire other public firms (Target) in the US between
1985 and 2010. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at
least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. In Panel A, “Other deal characteristics”
includes: acquirer size (log), relative size, all stock deal (1/0), dormant period >1 year (1/0), conglomerate
(1/0), tender offer (1/0), hostile (1/0), and acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log); “Other acquirer characteristics”
includes: acquirer Tobin’s q and acquirer cash-to-asset ratio. In Panel B, “Other deal characteristics” includes:
all stock deal (1/0), dormant period >1 year (1/0), and acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log); “Other acquirer
characteristics” includes: acquirer leverage and acquirer cash-to-asset ratio. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-statistics and z-statistics are reported
in parentheses in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.
Panel A: Announcement returns
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.0114a -0.0133a -0.0133a -0.0130a -0.0113a
(-2.95) (-3.90) (-3.93) (-3.82) (-3.16)
Target M/B to acquirer M/B ratio 0.0013
(0.18)
Toehold (1/0) -0.0108
(-1.23)
Competed (1/0) -0.0101c
(-1.82)
Target termination fees (1/0) -0.0078c
(-2.01)
Takeover premium -0.0100b
(-2.37)
All cash deal (1/0) 0.0262a 0.0205a 0.0207a 0.0199a 0.0212a
(4.81) (3.58) (3.59) (3.50) (3.89)
Acquirer price run-up -0.0132b -0.0148a -0.0147a -0.0149a -0.0082c
(-2.20) (-2.98) (-2.96) (-2.98) (-1.91)
Acquirer sigma 0.0369 0.0995b 0.1003b 0.0974b 0.0185
(1.20) (2.65) (2.67) (2.61) (0.76)
Acquirer leverage 0.0357b 0.0438a 0.0443a 0.0437a 0.0168
(2.07) (3.25) (3.30) (3.25) (1.18)
Acquirer past asset growth -0.0141b -0.0195a -0.0196a -0.0198a -0.0203
(-2.66) (-3.55) (-3.51) (-3.65) (-0.37)
Constant -0.0029 -0.0238 -0.0352 -0.0346 0.0404b
(-0.10) (-1.08) (-1.57) (-1.55) (2.65)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,055 4,111 4,111 4,111 3,155
Adjusted R-squared 0.106 0.095 0.095 0.096 0.114
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Panel B: Probability of deal success
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.8396a -0.8284a -0.8355a -0.8846a -0.6644a
(-7.94) (-7.50) (-7.75) (-8.57) (-4.85)
Target M/B to acquirer M/B ratio 0.0824
(1.20)
Toehold (1/0) -0.1445
(-0.40)
Competed (1/0) -0.5625a
(-3.65)
Target termination fees (1/0) 2.4947a
(13.84)
Takeover premium 0.7247a
(4.45)
Acquirer size (log) 0.1840a 0.1795a 0.1803a 0.1304a 0.2392a
(4.26) (4.94) (4.95) (3.82) (4.17)
Relative size -0.1421a -0.0656 -0.0626 -0.0749 -0.1955c
(-3.03) (-1.32) (-1.30) (-1.32) (-1.74)
All cash deal (1/0) -1.9797a -1.6314a -1.6439a -1.3129a -1.2050a
(-7.30) (-6.99) (-7.01) (-5.85) (-5.27)
Conglomerate (1/0) 0.5205a 0.4342a 0.4274a 0.3673b 0.1642
(2.85) (2.74) (2.67) (2.23) (0.82)
Tender offer (1/0) 1.8918a 1.5937a 1.6348a 1.2144a 1.3920a
(7.55) (7.16) (7.31) (5.75) (5.96)
Hostile (1/0) -2.7272a -2.7800a -2.8271a -2.4063a -2.8902a
(-7.20) (-9.12) (-8.93) (-8.94) (-7.92)
Acquirer price run-up 0.2070b 0.2035b 0.2119b 0.2490a 0.0340
(2.18) (2.44) (2.54) (2.91) (0.34)
Acquirer sigma -1.7060b -1.4710a -1.4340a -1.0023a -1.1710c
(-2.48) (-4.04) (-3.97) (-2.76) (-1.81)
Acquirer Tobin's q -0.0359c -0.0254c -0.0254c -0.0449b -0.0366
(-1.72) (-1.94) (-1.85) (-2.49) (-1.36)
Acquirer past asset growth 2.6466 3.2190c 3.1646c 2.0224 1.8328b
(1.59) (1.81) (1.75) (0.85) (1.98)
Constant 0.6634 0.3705 0.3489 -2.0265a -0.9940
(1.05) (0.83) (0.79) (-5.02) (-1.40)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,242 4,440 4,440 4,440 2,979
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.260 0.263 0.341 0.257
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 10: Quality of corporate governance
This table shows results from OLS regressions with acquirer announcement return as the dependent variable
(Panel A) and from Logistic regressions with the dependent variable that equals one if the bid is classified by
SDC as successful, and zero otherwise (Panel B). The sample in Panel A comprises 4,286 observations of US
public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm (Target) between 1985 and 2010. The sample in Panel
B contains all offers made by public firms (Acquirer) to acquire other public firms (Target) in the US between
1985 and 2010. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at
least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. In Panel A, “Other deal characteristics”
includes: acquirer size (log), all stock deal (1/0), toehold (1/0), dormant period >1 year (1/0), tender offer (1/0),
hostile (1/0), competed (1/0), acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log), and acquirer price run-up; “Other acquirer
characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q, acquirer leverage, acquirer cash-to-asset ratio, and acquirer past
asset growth. In Panel B, “Other deal characteristics” includes: all stock deal (1/0), toehold (1/0), dormant
period >1 year (1/0), competed (1/0), acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log), acquirer price run-up, and acquirer
sigma; “Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer cash-to-asset ratio and acquirer past asset growth.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-
statistics and z-statistics are reported in parentheses in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.
Panel A: Announcement returns
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.0074b -0.0093b -0.0149b
(-2.21) (-2.54) (-2.25)
Acquirer governance index -0.0005
(-0.73)
Acquirer entrenchment index -0.0002
(-0.13)
Acquirer managerial equity ownership 0.0002
(0.66)
Relative size -0.0075 -0.0134b -0.0065
(-1.42) (-2.32) (-1.21)
All cash deal (1/0) 0.0231a 0.0256a 0.0216b
(5.37) (6.54) (2.47)
Conglomerate (1/0) -0.0062c -0.0070b -0.0027
(-1.96) (-2.28) (-0.55)
Acquirer sigma -0.0522b 0.0224 -0.0533
(-2.14) (0.41) (-0.98)
Constant 0.0265 -0.0000 0.0313
(1.43) (-0.00) (1.21)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,548 1,752 943
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.090 0.101
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Panel B: Probability of deal success
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -1.0084a -1.0558a -0.7626a
(-6.37) (-7.25) (-2.78)
Acquirer governance index 0.0571
(1.12)
Acquirer entrenchment index 0.1977b
(2.11)
Acquirer managerial equity ownership -0.0448a
(-2.91)
Acquirer size (log) 0.3270a 0.2676a 0.2136
(3.17) (2.82) (1.24)
Relative size -0.7854b -0.7599a -0.2708
(-2.27) (-3.62) (-0.95)
All cash deal (1/0) -2.9282a -2.6591a -2.8325a
(-4.72) (-5.40) (-4.36)
Conglomerate (1/0) 0.6378b 0.6686b 0.4190
(2.20) (2.02) (1.07)
Tender offer (1/0) 2.4665a 2.3467a 2.4969b
(3.93) (4.92) (2.55)
Hostile (1/0) -4.0956a -3.3105a 0.0000
(-4.82) (-4.97) (.)
Acquirer Tobin's q -0.0296 -0.0367 -0.1568a
(-0.37) (-0.74) (-3.87)
Acquirer leverage 0.0392 0.0339 -3.5345a
(0.05) (0.05) (-4.32)
Constant -0.3457 -0.1254 5.6006a
(-0.21) (-0.09) (3.45)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,197 1,390 590
Pseudo R-squared 0.393 0.364 0.331
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table 11: Competition for market share
This table shows results from OLS regressions with acquirer announcement return as the dependent variable
(Panel A) and from Logistic regressions with the dependent variable that equals one if the bid is classified by
SDC as successful, and zero otherwise as (Panel B). The sample in Panel A comprises 4,286 observations of
US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm (Target) between 1985 and 2010. The sample in
Panel B contains all offers made by public firms (Acquirer) to acquire other public firms (Target) in the US
between 1985 and 2010. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that
are at least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. In Panel A, “Other deal characteristics”
includes: acquirer size (log), relative size, all stock deal (1/0), toehold (1/0), dormant period >1 year (1/0),
conglomerate (1/0), tender offer (1/0), hostile (1/0), competed (1/0), and acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log);
“Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q. In Panel B, “Other deal characteristics” includes:
toehold (1/0), dormant period >1 year (1/0), and acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log); “Other acquirer
characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q, acquirer leverage, and acquirer cash-to-asset ratio. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-statistics and
z-statistics are reported in parentheses in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.
Panel A: Announcement returns
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.0129a -0.0132a -0.0130a
(-3.93) (-3.62) (-3.65)
Acquirer's industry-adjusted sales growth 0.0090
(0.15)
Target's industry-adjusted sales growth -0.0043a
(-3.52)
Difference (target-acquirer) of industry-adjusted sales growth -0.0042a
(-3.02)
All cash deal (1/0) 0.0208a 0.0266a 0.0266a
(3.61) (4.81) (4.78)
Acquirer price run-up -0.0150a -0.0100c -0.0103c
(-2.97) (-1.98) (-2.00)
Acquirer sigma 0.1038b 0.0362 0.0395
(2.75) (1.16) (1.24)
Acquirer leverage 0.0460a 0.0420b 0.0447a
(3.30) (2.71) (2.81)
Acquirer cash-to-asset ratio 0.0580c 0.0718c 0.0740b
(1.94) (1.93) (2.07)
Acquirer past asset growth -0.0277 -0.0102c -0.0139b
(-0.50) (-1.84) (-2.64)
Constant -0.0258 -0.0051 -0.0094
(-1.15) (-0.17) (-0.30)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4,084 3,067 3,046
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.100 0.105
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Panel B: Probability of deal success
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.8470a -0.8376a -0.8446a
(-8.01) (-7.50) (-7.59)
Acquirer's industry-adjusted sales growth -1.4158b
(-2.26)
Target's industry-adjusted sales growth 0.5698
(0.23)
Difference (target-acquirer) of industry-adjusted sales growth 1.2367b
(2.52)
Acquirer size (log) 0.1719a 0.1907a 0.1831a
(4.59) (4.61) (4.16)
Relative size -0.0539 -0.1402a -0.1341a
(-1.13) (-3.23) (-3.24)
All cash deal (1/0) -1.6472a -1.9892a -1.9999a
(-7.09) (-7.45) (-7.54)
All stock deal (1/0) 0.0953 0.3041b 0.3283b
(0.73) (2.01) (2.05)
Conglomerate (1/0) 0.4361a 0.5315a 0.5517a
(2.80) (3.04) (3.20)
Tender offer (1/0) 1.6766a 1.9976a 2.0098a
(7.28) (7.62) (7.68)
Hostile (1/0) -2.8143a -2.6619a -2.6356a
(-9.15) (-7.52) (-7.29)
Competed (1/0) -0.6064a -0.6518a -0.6634a
(-4.09) (-4.01) (-4.18)
Acquirer price run-up 0.2208a 0.2027b 0.2141b
(2.79) (2.24) (2.46)
Acquirer sigma -1.4899a -1.4118b -1.4372b
(-3.89) (-2.31) (-2.14)
Acquirer past asset growth 1.8264b 2.4820 1.4609c
(2.28) (1.46) (1.65)
Constant 0.5040 0.4425 0.5656
(1.09) (0.81) (0.96)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,367 3,240 3,192
Pseudo R-squared 0.265 0.287 0.289
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
48
Table 12: Robustness to methodology and sample selection
This table shows a series of robustness tests. In Panel A, results are from OLS regressions with the acquirer
announcement return as the dependent variable. The specification used is always the same as specification 3 in Table 3.
In Panel B, results are from Logistic regressions with acquisition success as the dependent variable. The specification
is always the same as specification 3 in Table 4. Each line corresponds to the output where one element of the
methodology or the sample selection has been changed, except for “Full sample of acquisitions” where private (1/0)
and subsidiary (1/0) are added into control variables. Merger waves includes pre-wave (1/0), in-wave (1/0), and post-
wave (1/0). The ‘acquisitive effect’ refers to the coefficient of “Target pre3YR num of deals (log)” unless specified
otherwise. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-statistics and z-statistics are reported in
parentheses for OLS regressions (Panel A) and Logit regressions (Panel B), respectively.
Panel A: OLS regression with acquirer announcement return as the dependent variable
Acquisitive
effect t-statistics
Control
variables
Adjusted
R-square
Number of
observations
Default specification -0.0133a (-3.95) Yes 0.096 4,111
Changing control variables
. Controlling for size with ‘Mega deal’ dummy -0.0132a (-3.95) Yes 0.096 4,111
. Controlling for size with ‘target number of segments’ -0.0154a (-3.32) Yes 0.051 2,476
. Controlling for size with ‘target past asset growth -0.0132a (-3.55) Yes 0.100 3,072
. Controlling for merger waves -0.0133a (-3.89) Yes 0.095 4,111
. Controlling for year and industry fixed effects -0.0130a (-4.55) Yes 0.088 4,111
. Controlling for quarter and industry fixed effects -0.0127a (-4.58) Yes 0.085 4,111
. Controlling for month and industry fixed effects -0.0132a (-4.30) Yes 0.089 4,111
. Controlling for firm fixed effects -0.0106a (-2.84) Yes 0.570 4,111
. Controlling for quarter cross industry fixed effects -0.0132a (-2.87) Yes 0.281 4,111
. Controlling for month cross industry fixed effects -0.0114a (-3.08) Yes 0.067 4,111
Changing methodology
. Five year window to count past acquisitions -0.0111a (-4.79) Yes 0.095 4,111
. Use CAR (-2,+2) to measure abnormal returns -0.0135a (-3.35) Yes 0.106 4,111
. Use value-weighted CRSP index -0.0131a (-3.87) Yes 0.098 4,111
. Use market-adjusted model -0.0142a (-4.73) Yes 0.095 4,111
. Winsorize CAR at 5% and 95% percentile -0.0108a (-4.93) Yes 0.096 4,111
. ‘Acquisitive effect’ set to “Target is an acquisitive firm” -0.0104a (-2.87) Yes 0.093 4,111
. ‘Acquisitive effect’ set to “Target pre3YR value of deals” -0.0024a (-3.12) Yes 0.094 4,111
. Use double clustering (firm and year) -0.0133a (-3.96) Yes 0.096 4,111
Changing sample selection
. Include failed deals when counting past acquisitions -0.0120a (-4.01) Yes 0.095 4,111
. Include acquisitions of majority stake (>50%) -0.0102a (-2.92) Yes 0.089 4,269
. All stock deal -0.0168a (-2.93) Yes 0.351 1,811
. Cash and mixed deal -0.0067c (-1.64) Yes 0.108 2,300
. Include only pre-1997 acquisitions -0.0126b (-2.15) Yes 0.130 1,936
. Include only 1998-2000 acquisitions -0.0138c (-1.89) Yes 0.093 894
. Include only post-2001 acquisitions -0.0126a (-2.36) Yes 0.095 1,281
. Exclude ‘banking’ and ‘utility’ industries -0.0143a (-3.35) Yes 0.040 2,886
. Exclude conglomerate acquisitions -0.0129a (-3.25) Yes 0.166 2,802
. Exclude ‘rest of the industries’ deals -0.0134a (-4.09) Yes 0.099 3,578
. Full sample of acquisitions -0.0148a (-4.71) Yes 0.066 18,284
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Panel B: Logit regression with acquisition success as the dependent variable
Acquisitive
effect z-statistics
Control
variables
Adjusted
R-square
Number of
observations
Default specification -0.8363a (-7.76) Yes 0.263 4,440
Changing control variables
. Controlling for size with ‘Mega deal’ dummy -0.7443a (-7.34) Yes 0.257 4,440
. Controlling for size with ‘target number of segments’ -0.4817a (-3.47) Yes 0.263 2,572
. Controlling for size with ‘target past asset growth' -0.6972a (-7.36) Yes 0.279 3,266
. Controlling for merger waves -0.8355a (-7.76) Yes 0.263 4,440
. Controlling for year and industry fixed effects -0.7090a (-7.88) Yes 0.186 5,295
. Controlling for quarter and industry fixed effects -0.7061a (-7.81) Yes 0.203 5,295
. Controlling for month and industry fixed effects -0.7557a (-7.19) Yes 0.236 5,064
. Controlling for firm fixed effects -1.2406a (-7.03) Yes 0.310 1,617
. Controlling for quarter cross industry fixed effects -1.1159a (-6.89) Yes 0.299 2,750
. Controlling for month cross industry fixed effects -1.4302a (-6.08) Yes 0.323 1,456
Changing methodology
. Five year window to count past acquisitions -0.7803a (-9.16) Yes 0.265 4,440
. ‘Acquisitive effect’ set to “Target is an acquisitive firm” -0.9032a (-6.53) Yes 0.261 4,440
. ‘Acquisitive effect’ set to “Target pre3YR value of deals” -0.2344a (-9.18) Yes 0.270 4,440
. Use double clustering (firm and year) -0.8363a (-7.74) Yes 0.263 4,440
Changing sample selection
. Include failed deals when counting past acquisitions -0.8997a (-8.21) Yes 0.267 4,440
. Include acquisitions of majority stake (>50%) -0.8140a (-7.42) Yes 0.254 4,558
. All stock deal -0.5038b (-2.44) Yes 0.237 1,497
. Cash and mixed deal -1.1288a (-6.93) Yes 0.302 2,312
. Include only pre-1997 acquisitions -0.6772a (-6.48) Yes 0.257 2,226
. Include only 1998-2000 acquisitions -1.0463a (-4.79) Yes 0.353 1,043
. Include only post-2001 acquisitions -0.9334a (-3.66) Yes 0.242 1,172
. Exclude ‘banking’ and ‘utility’ industries -0.6307a (-4.61) Yes 0.249 3,051
. Exclude conglomerate acquisitions -0.8729a (-6.49) Yes 0.288 2,932
. Exclude ‘rest of the industries’ deals -0.8353a (-8.29) Yes 0.260 4,271
. Full sample of acquisitions -0.7428a (-8.13) Yes 0.266 16,922
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table A.1: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Target pre3YR num of
deals (log)
The natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of target’s mergers and
acquisitions made over the past three years. The counting is performed on
the “full sample of acquisitions”, which contains 53,798 acquisitions (see
Table 1).
Target pre3YR value of
deals (log)
The natural logarithm of (one plus) the sum of the dollar value of target’s
recent mergers and acquisitions made over the past three years.
Target is an acquisitive firm
(1/0)
A dummy variable that equals one if the target has made mergers or
acquisitions over the past three years, and zero otherwise.
Acquisitive firm A target that made mergers and acquisitions in the preceding three years.
Abnormal announcement
returns
The three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) centered on the
announcement date, using the CRSP equal-weighted index return as the
market return and with the market model parameters estimated over the
200-day period from event day -205 to event day -6.
Acquirer size (log) The natural logarithm of acquirer’s market value of equity calculated as the
number of shares outstanding times the stock price one month prior to the
announcement.
Relative size The deal value divided by “Acquirer size.”
All cash deal (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the transaction is financed entirely by
cash, and zero otherwise.
All stock deal (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the transaction is financed entirely by
stock, and zero otherwise.
Toehold (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer holds at least 5 percent of
the target shares, and zero otherwise.
Dormant period > 1 year
(1/0)
A dummy variable that equals one if no bidding has been made in the
acquirer’s industry (based on 4-digit CRSP SIC code) for more than one
year preceding the acquirer’s bid, and zero otherwise.
Conglomerate (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if a deal involves a target with a different
two-digit SIC code of the acquirer, and zero otherwise.
Tender offer (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition technique is a tender
offer as defined by SDC, and zero otherwise.
Hostile (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if target’s response is recorded as hostile
by SDC, and zero otherwise.
Competed (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if another deal for the same target is
announced in SDC during the 12 months prior to the announcement date,
and zero otherwise.
Acquirer pre3YR num of
deals (log)
The natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of acquirer’s recent mergers
and acquisitions made over the past three years.
Price run-up The market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return of the firm’s stock over
the period beginning 205 trading days and ending 6 trading days prior to
the announcement date.
Sigma The standard deviation of the firm’s market-adjusted daily returns beginning
205 and ending 6 trading days prior to the announcement date with CRSP
equal-weighted return as the market index.
Tobin’s q The book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market
value of equity, divided by the book value of assets.
Leverage Firm’s debt (total assets minus the book value of equity) divided by its
market value of assets.
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Cash-to-asset ratio Firm’s cash holdings divided by the market value of assets, cash includes
cash and marketable securities.
Past asset growth The percentage changes in total assets over one year preceding the
acquisition announcement.
Success (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the deal is successful as defined in SDC,
and zero otherwise.
Return on equity The ratio of net income before extraordinary items to the common and
preferred equity of a firm, averaged over a three-year period.
Growth Annual growth rate of firm’s net sales, averaged over a three-year period.
Liquidity The ratio of the net liquid assets to total assets, averaged over a three-year
period. The net liquid assets are defined as the cash and marketable
securities less the current liabilities.
Leverage The ratio of the long-term debt to the sum of preferred and common equity,
averaged over a three-year period.
Growth resource (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a combination of either low
growth – high liquidity – low leverage or high growth – low liquidity –
high leverage, and zero for all other combinations.
Industry (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if at least one acquisition occurred in the
firm four-digit SIC industry during the preceding year, and zero otherwise.
Size The number of shares outstanding times the stock price at the fiscal year end.
Market-to-book ratio The ratio of the market value of the common equity to the book value of the
common equity.
Price-earnings ratio The ratio of a firm’s stock price per share to its earnings per share.
Tried but failed to acquire
an acquisitive target (1/0)
A dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer withdrawn its acquisition
against the target who made at least one mergers and acquisitions in the
preceding three years.
Tried but failed to acquire a
non-acquisitive target
(1/0)
A dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer withdrawn its acquisition
against the target who did not make any mergers and acquisitions in the
preceding three years.
Successfully acquired an
acquisitive target (1/0)
A dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer successfully acquired the
target who made at least one mergers and acquisitions in the preceding
three years.
Governance index The corporate governance index in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) which
is based on 24 anti-takeover provisions.
Entrenchment index The entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) which is
based on 6 anti-takeover provisions.
Managerial equity
ownership
The total percentage of equity ownership held by directors and officers in the
fiscal year before the acquisition announcement.
Industry Herfindahl The Herfindahl index for a firm’s industry at the end of the year prior to the
acquisition announcement.
Target M/B to acquirer M/B
ratio
Target’s market-to-book assets divided by the acquirer’s market-to-book
assets.
Target termination fee (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the target has a termination fee
provision in the merger contract, and zero otherwise.
Takeover premium Takeover premium is calculated as in Officer (2003) and Cai and Sevilir
(2012).
Industry-adjusted sales
growth
The average annual industry-adjusted sales growth over the past three
years prior to the deal.
Post-wave (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the bid occurs within 36 months
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following the end of a Harford wave, and zero otherwise.
In-wave (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the bid occurs within 24 months of the
start of a Harford wave, and zero otherwise.
Pre-wave (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the bid occurs within the 12 months
prior to a Harford wave, and zero otherwise.
Private (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the target is a private firm, and zero
otherwise.
Subsidiary (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if the target is a non-public subsidiary of a
public or private firm, and zero otherwise.
Deal value (log) The natural logarithm of total value of consideration paid by the acquirer,
excluding fees and expenses, as reported by SDC.
Mega-deal (1/0) A dummy variable that equals one if a deal is in the top one percent of
distribution in term of stock market capitalization-adjusted deal value,
which equals the deal value divided by the total US stock market
capitalization on the day of the announcement.
Target number of segments
(log)
The natural logarithm of target’s number of segments from Compustat
Industry Segment database.
Target age (log) The natural logarithm of the number of calendar months that the target firm
has been listed on CRSP.
Liquidity index Liquidity index for the target is calculated as the value of all corporate
control transactions for $1 million or more reported by the SDC in the
target’s two-digit SIC code in the year of the merger announcement,
divided by the total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the
target’s two-digit SIC code in the same year.
Target incorporated in
Delaware (1/0)
A dummy variable that equals one if the target is incorporated in Delaware,
and zero otherwise.
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Table A.2: Sample distribution by year and industry
The sample comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm
(Target) between 1985 and 2010. Panel A sorts the acquisitions by calendar year. Panel B sorts the
acquisitions by Fama and French 48-industry classifications. Industries which have less than 50 deals are
grouped in the ‘Rest of the industries’ category. Announcement returns are measured as the cumulative
abnormal returns from one day before to one day after the announcement date, as in Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz (2004).
Panel A: By announcement year
Years
Number of
observations
Fraction of targets
that are acquisitive
targets
Average announcement returns
All deals
When an acquisitive
target is targeted
1985 123 21% -1.39% -2.91%
1986 125 19% 0.09% 0.15%
1987 109 20% 0.75% 0.60%
1988 112 15% 0.29% -3.24%
1989 95 19% 0.11% -0.54%
1990 67 13% -0.21% -2.06%
1991 86 22% -0.70% -0.38%
1992 103 18% -1.00% -3.60%
1993 133 19% 0.47% -0.29%
1994 214 22% 0.63% -1.29%
1995 247 25% -1.16% 0.12%
1996 268 26% 0.04% -1.19%
1997 344 31% -0.75% -1.92%
1998 368 35% -1.48% -3.01%
1999 308 38% -1.55% -3.20%
2000 264 30% -3.44% -5.17%
2001 199 33% -1.84% -3.06%
2002 134 25% -0.30% -2.29%
2003 162 25% -1.68% -3.06%
2004 156 29% -2.06% -4.08%
2005 146 29% -1.95% -3.28%
2006 146 28% -1.10% -1.10%
2007 136 33% -0.28% -1.76%
2008 74 32% -3.23% 0.16%
2009 80 21% 0.01% -3.75%
2010 87 26% -0.01% 0.96%
All 4,286 27% -0.98% -2.24%
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Panel B: By Fama-French 48 industries
Industries
Number of
observations
Fraction of targets
that are acquisitive
Average announcement returns
All deals Acquisitive targets
Banking 1,168 19% -1.34% -2.59%
Business Services 465 38% -2.49% -4.21%
Chemicals 50 32% 0.59% 0.14%
Communication 182 47% -0.96% -1.49%
Computers 171 33% -2.22% -3.35%
Consumer Goods 55 20% 0.48% -3.73%
Electronic Equipment 188 29% -2.14% -3.72%
Healthcare 93 47% -1.88% -1.95%
Insurance 145 29% -0.57% -0.76%
Machinery 92 34% -0.25% -0.26%
Measuring and Control Equipment 76 32% -0.31% 0.07%
Medical Equipment 106 28% -0.19% 2.47%
Petroleum and Natural Gas 146 35% -1.00% -1.79%
Pharmaceutical Products 165 18% -2.79% -6.55%
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 68 31% 1.12% -5.20%
Retail 127 24% 0.94% 1.20%
Trading 163 17% -1.02% -2.50%
Transportation 63 14% 1.61% -3.18%
Utilities 110 21% -2.02% -3.52%
Wholesale 96 36% -1.00% -3.11%
Rest of the industries 557 27% 0.98% -0.36%
All 4,286 27% -0.98% -2.24%
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of deal and firm characteristics
This table shows the average value of the explanatory variables used in regression analyses. The sample of
“all acquisitions” comprises 4,286 observations of public firms (Acquirer) that acquire a public firm (Target)
between 1985 and 2010 in the US. This sample is divided into two sub-samples. The first sub-sample contains
the acquisitions in which an acquisitive firm was targeted. The second sub-sample contains the acquisitions in
which a non-acquisitive firm was targeted. All variables are defined in Table A.1.
All
acquisitions
(1)
Acquisitive
targets
(2)
Non-acquisitive
targets
(3)
Difference
(2)-(3)
Deal value ($ billion) 1.289a 2.475a 0.848a 1.627a
Target size ($ billion) 1.038a 1.783a 0.701a 1.082a
Acquirer size ($ billion) 6.117a 10.364a 4.533a 5.830a
Relative size 0.475a 0.605a 0.426a 0.179a
All cash deal (1/0) 0.263a 0.192a 0.290a -0.097a
All stock deals (1/0) 0.439a 0.466a 0.429a 0.038b
Toehold (1/0) 0.031a 0.028a 0.032a -0.004
Dormant period >1 year (1/0) 0.132a 0.101a 0.143a -0.042a
Pre-wave (1/0) 0.086a 0.080a 0.088a -0.008
In-wave (1/0) 0.243a 0.284a 0.227a 0.057a
Post-wave (1/0) 0.194a 0.226a 0.183a 0.043a
Conglomerate (1/0) 0.319a 0.336a 0.312a 0.024
Tender offer (1/0) 0.157a 0.165a 0.153a 0.012
Hostile (1/0) 0.016a 0.020a 0.014a 0.006
Competed (1/0) 0.059a 0.056a 0.060a -0.004
Premium 0.629a 0.657a 0.616a 0.040b
Acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log) 0.730a 0.901a 0.666a 0.235a
Acquirer Tobin’s q 1.928a 2.148a 1.846a 0.302a
Acquirer leverage 0.484a 0.418a 0.508a -0.091a
Acquirer cash to asset ratio 0.083a 0.080a 0.085a -0.005
Acquirer sigma 0.261a 0.259a 0.262a -0.003
Acquirer price run-up 0.012 0.041c 0.002 0.039c
Acquirer past asset growth 0.007a 0.008a 0.007b 0.000
Target Tobin’s q 1.749a 1.918a 1.667a 0.250a
Target leverage 0.464a 0.431a 0.480a -0.049a
Target age (log) 4.443a 4.499a 4.418a 0.081b
Target cash to asset ratio 0.107a 0.094a 0.113a -0.019a
Liquidity index for target 0.054a 0.072a 0.047a 0.025a
Target incorporated in Delaware (1/0) 0.410a 0.536a 0.363a 0.173a
Target termination fees (1/0) 0.537a 0.645a 0.497a 0.148a
Target sigma 0.357a 0.333a 0.368a -0.035a
Target price run-up -0.017 -0.072a 0.008 -0.080c
Target past asset growth 0.006b 0.005a 0.007 -0.001
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
56
Table A.4: Acquirer announcement returns, deal size and target characteristics
This table is the same as Table 3 but with additional control variables. The sample comprises 4,286
observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm (Target) between 1985 and 2010.
All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at least once
significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. “Other deal characteristics” includes: relative size, all
stock deal (1/0), toehold (1/0), dormant period >1 year (1/0), conglomerate (1/0), tender offer (1/0), hostile
(1/0), competed (1/0), and acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log). “Other acquirer characteristics” includes:
acquirer cash-to-asset ratio. “Other target characteristics” includes: target price run-up, target sigma, liquidity
index for target, target incorporated in Delaware (1/0), target age (log), target termination fees (1/0), target
Tobin’s q, target leverage, and target cash-to-asset ratio. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All variables are
defined in Table A.1.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.0091b -0.0132a -0.0154a -0.0132a -0.0124a
(-2.30) (-3.95) (-3.32) (-3.55) (-3.63)
Deal value (log) -0.0040b
(-2.75)
Mega-deal (1/0) 0.0014
(0.16)
Target number of segments (log) 0.0011
(0.28)
Target past asset growth -0.0360
(-1.47)
Acquirer size (log) 0.0004
(0.22)
All cash deal (1/0) 0.0181a 0.0207a 0.0267a 0.0266a 0.0259a
(3.27) (3.64) (3.79) (4.78) (5.13)
Acquirer price run-up -0.0137b -0.0147a -0.0100c -0.0100b -0.0143b
(-2.63) (-3.02) (-1.78) (-2.06) (-2.27)
Acquirer sigma 0.0799b 0.0991a 0.0427 0.0361 0.0317
(2.20) (3.07) (1.39) (1.32) (1.21)
Acquirer Tobin's q -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0040a
(-0.45) (-0.61) (-0.75) (-0.81) (-5.27)
Acquirer leverage 0.0422a 0.0441a 0.0413b 0.0430b 0.0248
(3.10) (3.14) (2.23) (2.67) (1.59)
Acquirer past asset growth -0.0201a -0.0197a -0.0145b 0.0197 -0.0146a
(-3.94) (-3.51) (-2.44) (0.71) (-2.82)
Constant -0.0037 -0.0233 -0.0066 -0.0071 -0.0241
(-0.17) (-1.15) (-0.21) (-0.25) (-0.61)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other target characteristics No No No No Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4,111 4,111 2,476 3,072 2,947
Adjusted R-squared 0.100 0.096 0.051 0.100 0.116
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table A.5: Probability of deal success, deal size and target characteristics
This table is the same as Table 4 but with additional control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that equals one if the bid is classified by SDC as successful, and zero otherwise. The sample contains
all offers made by public firms (Acquirer) to acquire other public firms (Target) in the US between 1985 and
2010. All variables used in the table are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Only variables that are at least once
significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. “Other deal characteristics” includes: all stock deal (1/0),
toehold (1/0), and dormant period >1 year (1/0). “Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer leverage
and acquirer cash-to-asset ratio. “Other target characteristics” includes: liquidity index for target, target
leverage, and target cash-to-asset ratio. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by
acquisition year; the corresponding z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) -0.8095a -0.7443a -0.4817a -0.6972a -0.7442a
(-6.97) (-7.34) (-3.47) (-7.36) (-5.70)
Deal value (log) 0.0986b
(2.30)
Mega-deal (1/0) 0.5031b
(2.51)
Target number of segments (log) -0.2110a
(-2.60)
Target past asset growth -1.6067c
(-1.81)
Acquirer size (log) 0.2605a
(5.74)
Relative size -0.1100 -0.0925 -0.1592a -0.1925a -0.1186b
(-1.53) (-1.54) (-3.37) (-3.12) (-2.23)
All cash deal (1/0) -1.5675a -1.6335a -1.9203a -2.0190a -1.5969a
(-7.09) (-6.79) (-6.08) (-7.09) (-6.02)
Conglomerate (1/0) 0.4307a 0.4274a 0.4538b 0.4867a 0.3545c
(2.63) (2.60) (2.43) (2.63) (1.70)
Tender offer (1/0) 1.6475a 1.6946a 1.9991a 1.9929a 1.5277a
(7.33) (7.33) (7.26) (7.57) (6.20)
Hostile (1/0) -2.8741a -2.8395a -2.4982a -2.6752a -2.1130a
(-9.92) (-9.76) (-7.28) (-8.01) (-7.30)
Competed (1/0) -0.5961a -0.5674a -0.6889a -0.6303a -0.7098a
(-3.80) (-3.60) (-3.79) (-3.85) (-3.54)
Acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log) 0.1820a 0.2132a 0.1829 0.2213b 0.1295
(2.60) (2.99) (1.59) (2.46) (1.03)
Acquirer price run-up 0.2361a 0.2592a 0.2735a 0.2783a 0.1581
(2.75) (2.85) (2.92) (2.89) (1.14)
Acquirer sigma -2.0303a -2.4299a -2.6100a -2.6194a -1.6388b
(-4.66) (-5.47) (-3.46) (-4.06) (-2.28)
Acquirer Tobin's q -0.0161 -0.0099 -0.0202 -0.0183 -0.0666b
(-1.31) (-0.78) (-1.16) (-0.99) (-2.24)
Acquirer past asset growth 3.2851c 3.5316b 3.0976 2.9845c 2.4239
(1.75) (2.04) (1.50) (1.82) (0.89)
Target price run-up 0.3890b
(2.00)
Target sigma 1.6705a
(5.12)
Target incorporated in Delaware (1/0) -0.5154a
(-3.97)
Target age (log) -0.4090a
(-6.38)
Target termination fees (1/0) 2.9323a
(11.69)
Target Tobin's q -0.0931a
(-2.71)
Constant 1.2832a 1.9447a 3.0198a 2.3017a -1.1757
(3.12) (5.18) (6.19) (4.86) (-1.47)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other target characteristics No No No No Yes
Year * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,440 4,440 2,572 3,266 3,118
Pseudo R-squared 0.258 0.257 0.263 0.279 0.415
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table A.6: Takeover premium
This table shows results from OLS regressions with takeover premium as the dependent variable. The sample
comprises 4,286 observations of US public firms (Acquirer) that acquired a US public firm (Target) between
1985 and 2010. The takeover premium is calculated as in Officer (2003) and Cai and Sevilir (2012). All
variables used in the table are defined in Table A.1. Only variables, except our main variable ‘target pre3YR
num of deals’, that are at least once significant at a 5% level test are shown in the table. “Other deal
characteristics” includes: acquirer size (log), relative size, dormant period >1 year (1/0), conglomerate (1/0),
hostile (1/0), and competed (1/0). “Other acquirer characteristics” includes: acquirer Tobin’s q. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by acquisition year; the corresponding t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Target pre3YR num of deals (log) 0.0118 0.0096 0.0125
(0.74) (0.57) (0.74)
All cash deal (1/0) -0.1544a -0.1553a -0.1443a
(-4.29) (-4.33) (-4.34)
All stock deal (1/0) -0.1696a -0.1658a -0.1814a
(-6.08) (-6.16) (-8.12)
Toehold (1/0) -0.1723a -0.1617a -0.1786a
(-4.53) (-4.11) (-5.08)
Tender offer (1/0) 0.1130a 0.1084a 0.0776a
(4.16) (3.81) (3.13)
Acquirer pre3YR num of deals (log) 0.0226a 0.0279a 0.0276a
(2.85) (3.63) (3.63)
Acquirer price run-up 0.0780a 0.0836a 0.0918a
(7.82) (7.33) (8.75)
Acquirer sigma 0.4722a 0.3989a 0.1223
(6.43) (5.34) (1.47)
Acquirer leverage -0.1256a -0.0105
(-4.40) (-0.31)
Acquirer cash-to-asset ratio -0.1705b -0.1095c
(-2.20) (-1.84)
Acquirer past asset growth -0.4408a -0.3078c
(-3.40) (-1.87)
Constant 0.5325a 0.6699a 0.6970a
(11.22) (11.30) (8.66)
Other deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Other acquirer characteristics No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes
Industry fixed effects No No Yes
Number of Observations 3,272 3,155 3,155
Adjusted R-squared 0.079 0.085 0.124
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
